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In the Supre:me Court of the
State of Utah

GENERAL INSURANCE COMPAN:Y
OF AMERICA, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
No. 7671

vs.
MARK LEWIS,
Defendant and Respondent.

I

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant and respondent cannot wholly agree with
the statement of facts submitted by the Appellant in his
brief. That as far as the description of the starting of the
action and also the description of the insurance policies as
well as the damages the respondent agrees with.
On the morning of December 22, 1947, Mr. Park left
his home in the company with his son, Kenneth W. Park
1
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aria. a· Bill· Howell (Tr. 13 and .29)' for the purpose of proceeding to work at the plant of the Geneva Steel COmpany,
located just west of Orem, Utah (Tr. 10). Mr. Samuel
Park ·was driving his Studebaker sedan and his son and
Mr. Howell were riding as passengers in the front seat (Tr.
13 and 20). They proceeded from Provo, ·Utah, toward
the said steel plant along Highway 114, which is a twolane roadway, orie lane for northbound traffic-and one lane
for. southbound traffic (T~. 2, 3 and 10). This highway is
an. improved hard surfaced roadway and runs generally in
a· north~south direction near th~ steel I>lant (Tr.· 3 and 11).
A heavy snow was falling;: and ·the ·highway was covered
with har.d packed snow, and was icy in spots (Tr. 3, 4, 9,
~9, 24 and 25).
·.·
· · ·At about 8:40A.M. on this morning, Mr; Park brpught
his automobile to a ~top,_ f~cing noFth. on sp.id highway at
a point approximately one quarter of a mile south of the
Geneva plant (Tr. 3, 11 and 12). That Mr. Park's autom,obile was in rilnable condition at the time of his parking
on the main portion of the highway (Tr.. 14 and 17). He
stopped his car in the main traveled portion of the road
(Tr. 12) ~ That Mr. Park made no effort to pull off on the
shoulder of the road (Tr. 15). ·
.. , ~r. f.~k an~ his t~o pass~nge~s remained seated in
t~~. car and after about four or Jive minutes, his. auto~~ ..
bil~· was struGk from the rear by the defendant, Mark Lewis,
~iving his 1937 Plymouth Sedan Automobile (Tr. 2, 3, 4~··
5i,·, 6, 9, 11, 20 and 24). Immediately prior to this collision,
the. defendant was on his 'way t~ .work at the Gen~va Steel
Plant· -and Juid · as passengers in his car, Guy· Lewis and
Frank Claysotf (Tr. 6). He was driving between 15 arid.
20 miles per hour arid his car-··was following ·the autorrto-
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bile of one George Armour (Tr. 4 and 25). Armour pulled
off the highway to the rear of the Park automobile and
when the defendant applied his brakes on his car, the same
skidded on the highway, collided with the left side of the
Armour vehicle and skidded into the rear of the Park automobile (Tr. 4, 5, 8, 9, 24, 25, 26 and 27). The impact
against the rear of the Park car caused it to collide with
the rear of the automobile directly in front of it (Tr. 12,
13 and 21). The impact of the defendant's car with the
rear of the Park vehicle was sufficiently severe to tear
loose the front seat of the Park vehicle and throw Park
and his two companions into the rear seat (Tr. 12, 13 and
20).
The Court entered judgment in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff Insurance Company, no cause of
action.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
The respondent will take up the following points which
are practically the same as appellant and are in the same

order.
1. Did the Court err in making and entering Finding
of Fact No. 7 to the effect "that after Samuel P. Park
stopped his automobile, he did nothing to warn the defendant or other drivers of other automobiles approaching
from the south upon said highway and that by failing to
do so, he was guilty of negligence which contributed to the
damages sustained to his automobile," for the reason tnat
said Finding is not contrary to la\V.
2. Did the Court err in making and entering Finding
of Fact No. 7 to the effect "that the said Samuel P. P~rk
failed to move his car off the road onto the shoulder and
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parked in the lane of traffic, and that by so doing he was
guilty of negligence which contributed to the damages sus..
tained to his automobile," the said finding is supported by
the evidence and law.
Is there evidence to support the Conclusion of Law No.
1, and the judgment of no cause of action? Yes, the
Court's decision is fully supported by the evidence and the
law.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

The trial Court concluded that the plaintiff's insured
omitted to do acts that resulted in his contributory negJi..
gence.
The evidence in this case shows that the plaintiff's in..
sured stopped in the main lane of traffic upon a highway.
There is no evidence in the whole. record showing a necessary purpose for the insured to remain there. The car
was in ninahle condition all the time that he was parked
on the main' road and blocked traffic. That the defendant
had a right to proceed along the highway as a reasonable
prudent man would anticipating that no one would block
the highway.. The plaintiffs insured had a duty to warn
approaching cars of the trouble on the highway. This he
did not do thereby becoming negligent. himself..
The ·appellant .in. his brief relies on the case of Reu..
ben E. Caperton v. Ben Mast et al, 85 Cal. App. 2nd 157,
192 Pac. 2nd 467, the plaintiff had a trailer hitched to the
rear of his car. The facts of this case are dissimilar and ·
not in point to the one appealed here. The facts in this
cited case were as follows: The defendant had seen the·
car and trailer for over 600 feet and that the car and ve- ·
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hicle stalled because of a mechanical failure thus making·
it an emergency stop. This case is not in point.
The appellant also relies on the case of James E. Smith
vs. Clinton Webb, 10 S. E. 2d 503, 131 A. L. R. 558, to be
in point, However, a careful reading of the case will reveal
that the school bus pulled off to the right to take on a
passenger from the opposite side of the road. That the·
vision of the defendant in this case was not obstructed and·
not only could the defendant see the school bus but also
the passenger come from the opposite side of the road.
This case is not in point.
The appellant also relies on the case of Conrey vs.
Abramson, 294 Mass. 431, 2 N. E. 2d 203, but again in this
case the facts are dissimilar. The defendant made a hurried stop in this case and another vehicle coming in back
of him stopped and a third in which the plaintiff was riding ran into the second, the· second car rammed the defendant's. The court merely held in that case that defendant was not bound to anticipate that a passenger in the
third car would be injured. The facts are entirely differ- ·
ent in our case.
The appellant cites Estes vs. Slater, 3 N. Y. Supp. 2d
287, 18 N. E. 2d. 690, but a careful reading of this memorandum decision would show that hitting a car in. the rear
was not the. issue. The plaintiff's were proceeding down·:
the road when they ran into the back of a parked car.
They proce~ed down ~he roac:l_ ~d pulled off to the side
then they went back to confer with the owner of the car ·
they had hit. That while standing ·alongside the car the·
plaintiffs were injured. That this case is an accident between vehicles and pedestrians.
The appellant cites Winter vs. Davis, 217 Iowa 424,
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251_N. w~ 770, 42 C. J. Para. 13, page 613 as holding that
the temporary stopping on the proper side of the high-..
way for a necessary purpose is not negligence. This case
is not in point with ours in that the plaintiff in the cited
case had stopped his vehicle over off the street as far as
he could get and had stopped to clean his windshield. The
defendant was proceeding in the opposite direction when he
went diagonally across the road and hit the plaintiff.
The only conclusion to draw from the appellant's cases
cited is that they are not in point and that the rules of
law expounded therein do not apply.
In general, the question of the pla~tiff's contributory
negligence presents a question of fact for the jury t~ d~
cide upon the basis of all the facts and circwnstances sUrrounding the accident. 5 American Jurisprudence, para.
407 at page 740.
We respectfully submit that the plaintiff's insured had
the duty to warn the other motorists using the highway.
That the whole question of contributory negligence is for
the trier of the facts and that the evidence in this case
would hold the plaintiff's insured contributorily negligent.
POINT II

The contention of the defendant and respondent is that
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in not moving off
the highway.
Contributory negligence is usually a fact to be determined by the trier of the facts. Reuben E. Caperton v.
Ben Mast et al, 85 Cal. App. 2nd 157, 192 Pac. 2d 467.
The statute in Utah. would seem to be controlling in
this case. Quoting from the Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
57-7-165:
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''(a) Upon any hi~hway outside of a .. busin.ess or"·
· _residez:1ce district no person shall .stop, park, or leave:
standing any vehicle, whether attended or unatt~nde,9,
upon the paved or main traveled part of the highway
when it is practical to stop, park, or so leave such·
vehicle off such part of said highway, but in every
event an unobstructed width of the highway opposite·
a ·standing ·-vehicle shall be left for the free passage of.
other ·vehicles and a clear view of such stopped .ve- .
hicle shall be available from a distance of 200 feet in
each direction upon such highway.
"This section shall not -apply to the driver of any
vehicle which is disabled while on the paved or main
traveled portion of a highway in such manner and _to
- _._ suc..h. extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping arid
temporarily ~~~yi~~ ~uch disabled vehicle in such p~
sition."
There can be no doubt in this case that the plaintiff
by using due CB:re could have pulled his car off the high..
way inasmuch as the Armour vehicle pulled off to the rear
of the Park vehicle (Tr. 4). The evidence is indisputable
that Park had four to five minutes to accomplish the _act.
(Tr. 15) . That the Park car was not disabled in any way
but was in a runable condition (Tr. 14) .
.Thus under the state law of Utah the pl~tiff's insured
was contributorily negligent for parkll:lg on a main travel~4portion of the highway and there is evidence of thi~ negli- ,
gence and fully suppo~s the court's finding of fact.

POINT III
The trial court had the duty to listen to all the· evidence and reconcile the conflicts to arrive at the true· facts.,
That the record is complete to show that Park had the
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duty to remove his car off the main thoroughfare that by
not doing so he was negligent. That the record supports
the trial court's Conclusion of Law No. 1.
CONCLUSION

We respectfully submit that the judgment of the trial
court was correct and should be affirmed with costs in
favor of the Respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL J. MERRILL
Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent
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